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Initializing Perturbations in Multiple Directions
for Fast Adversarial Training
Xunguang Wang, Ship Peng Xu, and Eric Ke Wang
Abstract—Recent developments in the filed of Deep Learn-
ing have demonstrated that Deep Neural Networks(DNNs) are
vulnerable to adversarial examples. Specifically, in image classi-
fication, an adversarial example can fool the well trained deep
neural networks by adding barely imperceptible perturbations
to clean images. Adversarial Training, one of the most direct
and effective methods, minimizes the losses of perturbed-data to
learn robust deep networks against adversarial attacks. It has
been proven that using the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
can achieve Fast Adversarial Training. However, FGSM-based
adversarial training may finally obtain a failed model because
of overfitting to FGSM samples. In this paper, we proposed the
Diversified Initialized Perturbations Adversarial Training (DIP-
FAT) which involves seeking the initialization of the perturbation
via enlarging the output distances of the target model in a
random directions. Due to the diversity of random directions,
the embedded fast adversarial training using FGSM increases
the information from the adversary and reduces the possibility
of overfitting. In addition to preventing overfitting, the extensive
results show that our proposed DIP-FAT technique can also
improve the accuracy of the clean data. The biggest advantage of
DIP-FAT method: achieving the best banlance among clean-data,
perturbed-data and efficiency.
Index Terms—Adversarial Examples, Fast Adversarial Train-
ing, overfitting, robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Neural Networks(DNNs) have achieved great suc-cess in a variety of applications, mainly including Com-
puter Vision [1]–[3], Speech Recognition [4] and Natural
Language Processing [5]. Despite achieving remarkable accu-
racy on many benchmark datasets, recent studies have shown
taht DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are
carefully crafted by adding imperceptible noises to natural
inputs, but can fool the networks to output wrong predictions.
The existence of Adversarial Examples illustrates the poten-
tial vulnerabilities of Deep Learning. In image classification
task, although the networks are fed with printed adversarial
examples obtained from a camera which simulates physical
attacks, lots of images are classified incorrectly [6]. Another
typical example about physical attacks is that the ”STOP” sign
with adversarial stickers mislead the perceptual systems into
misclassifying it [7]. Thus, adversarial examples bring great
challenges to the applications of the physical world and how
to defend against them is an important and urgent problem
that must be solved.
There have been a cohort of works on resisting various ad-
versarial attacks. One of the most direct methods is adversarial
training [8], [9] that can effectively improve the robustness
of DNNs by minimize the losses of adversarial examples
generated in each step of learning. Recently, different works
[9]–[13] on adversarial training greatly extend the standard ad-
versarial training [8]. Madry et al. [9] used the more powerful
PGD attack for adversarial training such that the model after
trained can can enhance the ability to resist general attacks
such as FGSM. Another improvement way is to increase the
diversity of adversarial examples, for which Trame`r et al. [10]
proposed Ensemble Adversarial Training. Both of the PGD
and the ensemble adversarial training improve robustness via
better perturbations. The rest of methods [11]–[13] are to
reduce convergence time of adversarial training.
It is evident that adversarial training methods [8]–[10]
have led to significant progress in improving adversarial
robustness, where using PGD adversary [9] is recognized as
the most effective methods in adversarial training. However,
PGD adversarial training is computationally expensive because
PGD involves multiple random initializations and iterative
gradient calculations when seeking adversarial perturbations.
Fortunately, many methods [11]–[14] have been proposed to
speed up this adversarial learning. By replacing PGD with a
single-step FGSM [8] to produce perturbations, Wong et al.
[14] proposed the fastest adversarial training algorithm called
revisiting FGSM adversarial training which has very close
adversarial accuracies to the standard PGD-based training [9].
Although the author claims to be able to train a robust classifier
in 6 minutes [14], it is practically found that the target model
is quite possible to fall into overfitting and thus cannot resist
PGD attacks. The most likely reason is that the perturbations
only covers a smaller subset compared to PGD.
In the present paper, we follow up the study of the FGSM-
based training [14] and conduct further research on diversified
random initialization of perturbations. Compared with the
previous method [14], the main contributions of this paper
are as follows:
1) The Random Diversified Initialization (RDI) technique
is proposed to replace the simple random initialization
of perturbations. It makes the generated perturbations
more diverse and increases the difficulty of adversarial
training.
2) The catastrophic overfitting of FGSM-based adversarial
training was solved so that the target model can be
trained with many epochs to fit all data.
3) the proposed method achieves the best banlance among
clean-data, perturbed-data and efficiency, which means
that we trained the most robust model between clean-
data and perturbed-data in the same short time.
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II. RELATED WORKS
A. Adversarial Attacks
Since Szegedy et al. [15] discovered the properties of
adversarial examples, various adversarial attacks have been
proposed to fool a trained DNN by designing adversarial
perturbations. There are two types of attacks: white-box at-
tacks know the whole structure of the target model being
attacked(i.e., FGSM [8], PGD [9] and C&W [16]), and black-
box attacks only have access to the prediction of the target
model(i.e., SBA [17] and ZOO [18]), which are briefly intro-
duced as follows.
1) FGSM Attack: The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[8] is an efficient one-step method to generate adversarial
examples. Given an input x, it aims at quickly finding a
perturbation direction of x to increase the training loss function
of the target model such that the model will classify x incor-
rectly. Concretely, the adversarial perturbation is produced by
calculating the gradient of the loss function with respect to x
and multiplying the gradient by a constant ǫ:
x′ = x+ ǫ · sign (∇xL(x, y)) (1)
where y is the true class label for the input instance x, L is
the loss function,∇xL(x, y) is the gradient, sign(·) is the sign
function, ǫ controls attack intensity, and x′ is the adversarial
example obatained.
2) PGD Attack: The Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is
a iterative variant of FGSM and also generates L∞ adversarial
perturbations. Given an input x, the process of PGD to obtain
an adversarial example can be expressed as:
x′i+1 = Clipǫ {x
′
i + α · sign (∇xL (x
′
i, y))} for i
= 0 to n
(2)
where Clipǫ restricts x
′
i in ǫ-neighborhood, x
′
0 is a original
image perturbed with ǫ-ball random noise in ℓp norm, and α is
the step size. PGD is considered to be the strongest first-order
attack.
3) ODI-PGD Attack: The ODI-PGD [19] is a PGD-
based attack using ODI (Output Diversified Initialization) [19]
method which produce initial perturbations. The ODI changes
the output logits in random direction and then calculates the
perturbations by back propagation. In addition to PGD, ODI
has strengthened the C&W [16] attack. Inspired by ODI, we
also explore to output diversified initialization of perturbations.
In contrast to that, our perturbations produced by RDI are more
diverse and mainly strengthen adversarial training.
B. Adversarial Training methods
Adversarial training [8] is a simple defense method against
adversarial attacks in which a model is retrained by adding
perturb-data into training set at every training step for im-
proving robustness of the model. With the development of
adversarial attacks, adversarial training has been also improved
continuously.
1) PGD Adversarial Trainging: PGD Adversarial Traing-
ing [9] uses PGD as adversary. What is more, Madry et al.
redefined the form of adversarial training:
argmin
θ
E
[
max
‖x′−x‖
∞
L (x′, y)
]
(3)
where the goal of the inner maximization is to find adversarial
examples which maximize the loss of the target model, while
the outer minimization is a optimization process to obtain the
parameters θ that minimize the loss caused by the adversarial
inputs. Different with standard adversarial training [8], the
PGD one only rely on adversarial examples to train the model.
A model trained by PGD in standard training framework [8]
can defend against FGSM, but not vice versa, because PGD
attacks are stronger than FGSM.
2) Revisiting FGSM Adversarial Trainging: Revisiting
FGSM Adversarial Trainging [14] is the fastest strategy to
train a roubust model against gradient-based attacks like
FGSM and PGD. For example, under the author’s experimental
setting, a CIFAR-10 [20] classifer only need 6 minutes and an
ImageNet classifier is trained completely in 12 hours, reducing
10 and 38 hours respectively compared to free adversarial
training [11]. Surprisingly, the key to significantly reducing
training time but is only to replace PGD with FGSM. Despite
the huge advantage on acceleration, this schema is easy to
overfit and then cannot defend against PGD attacks, which
is why the previous studies failed in using FGSM to train a
robust model against other more powerful attacks.
III. PROPOSED TRAINING ALGORITHM
In this section, We first introduce the overview of the
proposed algorithm, which incorporates the random diversified
initialization of perturbations and FGSM-based adversarial
training. Then, the detailed adversarial training and the random
initialization will be given.
Algorithm 1 Revisiting FGSM Adversarial Trainging
Input: a classifier fθ , radius ǫ, step size α, training epochs
T , size M of a dataset
Output: θ
for t = 1...T do
for i = 1...M do
//Perform FGSM adversarial attack
δ = Uniform (−ǫ, ǫ)
δ = δ + α · sign (∇δℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi))
δ = max(min(δ, ǫ),−ǫ)
θ = θ−∇θℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi) // Update model weights
end for
end for
A. FGSM-based adversarial training
In this work, we follow the algorithm called Revisiting
FGSM Adversarial Training. This FGSM adversarial training
uses FGSM as adversary, but it has the close defense score to
the PGD-based training. And the pseudo-code for this training
method is provided in Algorithm 1. Due to the FGSM only
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calculates the gradient in one-step, the FGSM-based training is
much faster than the training based on the iterative PGD attack.
In addition, different with naive FGSM adversarial training [8],
random initialization for the perturbation is embedded before
training, as shown in Algorithm 1. The random initialization
can expand the space of perturbations so that the calculated
perturbations cover a subset of PGD, which is the key to
defend against PGD attacks successfully.
B. Random Diversified Initialiaztion for perturbations
The perturbations of previous attacking methods [21]–[23]
like PGD are directly sampled from a uniform distribution
in ǫ-ball norm of the input pixel space. Inspired by the novel
random initialization strategy called Output Diversified Initial-
ization (ODI), we proposed Random Diversified Initialization
(RDI) for FGSM-based adversarial training.
Like ODI, RDI encourages the diversity in the output
space to calculate the diversified perturbations in the input
space. Given the input x and the classifier f , the optimization
problem of initializing the perturbations is formulated as:
max
δ∈Pǫ
wTdf(x+ δ) (4)
where f(x + δ) is the output logits of f , wd ∈ R
C defines
the direction of the diversification in C-dimension space (C
is the number of classes of f ), and Pǫ is the perturbation set
constrained by ǫ. The maximization in Eq. (4) aims to drive the
output of f away from the original output along the direction
wd which is randomly sampled from the uniform distribution
[−1, 1]C . Similar with PGD, we adopt iterative gradients to
update δ:
δn+1 = Clipǫ
(
δn + αrdi sign
(
∇δw
⊤
d fθ (x+ δn)
))
(5)
where δn is updated in the n-th iteration, Clipǫ constraints δ
within the bound [−ǫ, ǫ]. Note that ∇δ is derived for δ, which
is different with ODI that calculates the gradient with respect
to x.
C. Diversified Initialized Perturbations Adversarial Training
The combination of RDI and FGSM-based training is our
proposed method, where RDI initializes the perturbations and
FGSM-based training makes the model robust by adversarial
learning. Depending on whether to reuse the perturbation δ,
we divide the RDI-FAT into two types: the previous training
and the random initialization training.
As shown in Algorithm 2, the previous training is the
way that used perturbations in current iteration is from the
previous iteration. The idea of the previous schema comes
from free adversarial training [11]. Another way is the random
initialization training which initializes the perturbation in each
batch of learning before RDI. The initialization training is
summarizd in Algorithm 3. Nrdi is the number of RDI steps.
In theory, the larger the Nrdi, the logits output by fθ is away
from the starting point. In order to control the cost of time,
Nrdi does not exceed 2 in general. In particular, in Algorithm
2, we recommend Nrdi = 1.
Algorithm 2 Diversified Initialized Perturbations Adversarial
Training (DIP-FAT): Previous
Input: a classifier fθ, radius ǫ, step size α of FGSM, training
epochs T , size M of a dataset, number of RDI steps Nrdi,
step size αrdi of RDI
Output: θ
Initialize: δ = 0 // Initialize the perturbation with 0
for t = 1...T do
for i = 1...M do
wd = Uniform (−1, 1)
C // Randomize the direction
vector
for n = 1...Nrdi do
αrdi = Uniform (0, 2α)
gn ← ∇δw
⊤
d fθ (xi + δ)
δ ← δ + αrdi sign (gn)
δ = max(min(δ, ǫ),−ǫ)
end for
// Perform FGSM adversarial attack
δ = δ + α · sign (∇δℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi))
δ = max(min(δ, ǫ),−ǫ)
θ = θ −∇θℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi)
end for
end for
Algorithm 3 Diversified Initialized Perturbations Adversarial
Training (DIP-FAT): Random initialization
Input: a classifier fθ, radius ǫ, step size α of FGSM, training
epochs T , size M of a dataset, number of RDI steps Nrdi,
step size αrdi of RDI
Output: θ
for t = 1...T do
for i = 1...M do
δ = Uniform (−ǫ, ǫ) // Initialize perturbations in a
random direction
wd = Uniform (−1, 1)
C // Randomize the direction
vector
for n = 1...Nrdi do
αrdi = Uniform (0, 2α)
gn ← ∇δw
⊤
d fθ (xi + δ)
δ ← δ + αrdi sign (gn)
δ = max(min(δ, ǫ),−ǫ)
end for
// Perform FGSM adversarial attack
δ = δ + α · sign (∇δℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi))
δ = max(min(δ, ǫ),−ǫ)
θ = θ −∇θℓ (fθ (xi + δ) , yi)
end for
end for
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiment setup
1) Datasets: The experiments were conducted on MNIST
[24] and CIFAR-10 [20] benchmarks. The MNIST [24] is
a dataset for handwritten digit recognition with 70K 28×28
gray-scale images, where 60K images are training examples
and 10K images are test examples. The CIFAR-10 [20] con-
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TABLE I
ROBUSTNESS OF DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ON MNIST
Method Clean PGD(=0.1) PGD(=0.3) FGSM(=0.1)
PGD 98.99% 97.55% 89.04% 97.7%
FGSM 98.50% 96.76% 88.34% 97.1%
ours 98.80% 97.09% 88.63% 97.6%
tains 50K training samples and 10K test samples of 32×32
color image for image classification.
2) Experimental environment and acceleration skills: All
experiments in this paper are run on a single NVIDIA Tesla
P100 (16GB). The deep learning framework is pytorch 1.4.0.
Unlike wong et al. [14], we only use the cyclic learning rate
[25], [26] to reduce the number of epochs required for training,
because not all GPUs support the mixed-precision [27], which
is more in line with the real situation.
B. Verified performance on MNIST
Since the FGSM-based training [14] benefits from the ran-
dom initialization, we wonder if the RDI works for robustness
of DNNs. To demonstrate RDI confers real robustness to the
model, we followed the experiment [14] on MNIST [24]. We
did not randomly initialize perturbations, in order to increase
the credibility. We adopt algorithm 2 with ǫ = 0.3, Nrdi = 1,
and the other parameters as the same as [14]. The exact
verification results can be seen in Table 1, where we can find
that our result is closer to PGD adversarial training on MNIST
than the FGSM method [14].
C. Verified performance on CIFAR-10
In this section, we test our proposed technique on CIFAR-10
to show the effect of the diversified initialization in FGSM-
based adversarial training. We trained the PreAct ResNet18
architecture with radius ǫ = 8/255 and α = 10/255. The
results are given in Table 2. We listed the PGD [9], the Free
[11], the FGSM [14] and ours, where the PGD trained 40
epochs, the Free trained 96 epochs, the FGSM trained 30
epochs. To be fair, our methods also only trained 30 epochs.
The best adversarial accuracy (PGD, ǫ = 8/255) was picked
by the Free, and the best standard accuracy tested by the clean-
data (the natural images) was picked by our previous method
(Nrdi = 2). Our methods perform well on the clean-data. In
contrast to the FGSM schema, our methods improve accuracy
on both clean-data and perturbed-data only by increasing the
tolerable time cost. In addition, we found that the result inNrdi
is better than Nrdi = 1, which verifies that the perturbation is
gradually far away from the starting point with the increase
of calculation steps.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we combined the diversified initialization for
adversarial perturbations and FGSM-based adversarial training
and proposed the random diversified initialization fast ad-
versarial training (RDI-FAT). Through extensive experiments,
the proposed adversarial training not only solves the problem
of over fitting in FGSM training, but also improves the
performance on both clean-data accuracy and perturbed-data
accuracy.
TABLE II
STANDARD AND ROBUST PERFORMANCE OF VARIOUS ADVERSARIAL
TRAINING METHODS ON CIFAR-10 FOR ǫ = 8/255 AND THEIR
CORRESPONDING TRAINING TIMES
Method Clean PGD(ǫ = 8/255) Time(min)
PGD-7 [9] 87.30% 45.80% 1426.00
Free (m=8) [11] 85.96% 46.33% 351.68
FGSM [14]
- previous init 86.02% 42.37% 25.21
- random init 84.01% 45.25% 25.81
The previous: Nrdi = 1 85.02% 45.26% 40.26
The previous: Nrdi = 2 88.12% 45.93% 53.85
The random: Nrdi = 1 87.19% 44.05% 40.72
The random: Nrdi = 2 86.40% 45.57% 54.80
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